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“A DEFENDANT’S PARADISE”:
FAILINGS OF THE BROOKE GROUP TEST
IN THE AIRLINE AND E-COMMERCE INDUSTRIES
KAITLYN THORSON*

ABSTRACT
The airline and e-commerce industries have notable and important parallels, particularly when viewed the antitrust context.
Both industries are controlled by large, powerful companies operating across several markets guarded by substantial barriers to
entry, which presents the opportunity for such companies to use
predatory pricing to threaten—or extinguish—new and existing
competition. Predatory pricing, which is prohibited by the
Robinson-Patman Act and § 2 of the Sherman Act, can take different forms, but it has been defined generally as pricing goods
or services below a relevant measure of cost with the dangerous
probability of recouping foregone profits in the primary market.
This definition of the offense and the Brooke Group test derived from it have allowed companies to avoid antitrust scrutiny
despite their use of predatory pricing tactics as an anticompetitive tool. Specifically, the Brooke Group analysis fails to properly
identify cases of predatory pricing because it avoids chilling
competition at the expense of allowing actual anticompetitive
conduct to continue unrestrained. Since 1993, when the seminal case Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
was decided, predatory pricing cases have been doomed from
the moment the suits are filed: a vast majority of the cases are
dismissed on summary judgment, and the cases that do survive
motions for summary judgment are uniformly decided in favor
of the defendant.
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2022; B.B.A. Finance,
Texas Tech University, 2017. Special thanks to Dean C. Paul Rogers III for his
assistance in selecting the topic of this Comment and for being a wonderful
Antitrust professor. Thanks also to the SMU Law Review Association editors for
their input.
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The Brooke Group test largely is not equipped to detect the very
conduct it was created to address. As demonstrated by the test’s
application in the airline and e-commerce industries, the belowcost requirement should be adjusted to allow for incrementalcost analysis where appropriate. Additionally, the recoupment
prong of the test should be altered to allow plaintiffs to show
that companies that incur losses in the primary market are recouping them in different markets or product lines. This
change should properly balance the competing concerns of chilling legitimate, pro-competitive business practices and protecting the competitive process.
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INTRODUCTION

A

T FIRST BLUSH, it may seem farfetched to suggest that the
airline and e-commerce industries have notable and important parallels, but this truth is uniquely evident in the context of
antitrust lawsuits. Importantly, both industries are primarily controlled by large, powerful companies operating across several
different markets guarded by substantial barriers to entry, which
presents the opportunity for such companies to use their market
power to threaten—or extinguish—new and existing competition.1 These companies have used predatory pricing, among

1 See David M. Magness, Comment, Getting Past Summary Judgment in Predatory
Pricing Cases After American Airlines: Will Post-Chicago Analysis Ever Prevail?, 5 HOUS.
BUS. & TAX L.J. 424, 428, 430 (2005); Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox,
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other strategies, to maintain their market position by driving out
competition.2 Predatory pricing, which is prohibited by the
Robinson-Patman Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act, can take
different forms, but it has been defined generally as pricing
goods or services below the relevant measure of cost with the
dangerous probability of recouping foregone profits in the primary market.3
This definition of the offense and the Brooke Group test derived from it are major reasons why companies have been able
to avoid antitrust scrutiny despite years-long use of predatory
pricing tactics as an anticompetitive tool. Specifically, the rule’s
rigid below-cost and recoupment prongs serve as a substantial
barrier to plaintiffs seeking to prove that companies are, in fact,
engaged in violations of United States antitrust laws.4 Since
1993, when the seminal case Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.5 was decided, predatory pricing cases have
been doomed from the moment the suits are filed. Numerous
cases have been dismissed on summary judgment, and many of
the cases that do survive motions for summary judgment have
been decided in favor of the defendant.6 Astoundingly, not a
single predatory pricing case has succeeded on the merits since
the Brooke Group decision was handed down.7
The current antitrust framework, as articulated in Brooke
Group, “fails to capture the architecture of market power in the
twenty-first-century marketplace.”8 It repeatedly has proven to
126 YALE L.J. 710, 716 (2017) (“It is as if Bezos charted [Amazon’s] growth by first
drawing a map of antitrust laws, and then devising routes to smoothly bypass
them . . . . Amazon has marched toward monopoly by singing the tune of contemporary antitrust.”).
2 See William N. Evans & Ioannis N. Kessides, Localized Market Power in the U.S.
Airline Industry, 75 REV. ECON. & STAT. 66, 66 (1993); Khan, supra note 1, at 716.
3 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
222–23 (1993).
4 Magness, supra note 1, at 428–32.
5 Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. 209.
6 C. Scott Hemphill & Philip J. Weiser, Beyond Brooke Group: Bringing Reality to
the Law of Predatory Pricing, 127 YALE L.J. 2048, 2049, 2062–63 (2018) (“While it is
true that no predatory pricing case . . . has been litigated to a final judgment for
plaintiffs, this is not too revealing, as very few antitrust cases reach a final judgment. Numerous predatory pricing cases have survived summary judgment, while
others have survived dismissal. It is likely that still other cases have settled favorably without ever leaving a notable opinion.”) (footnotes omitted).
7 See Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing:
Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO L.J. 2239, 2258–59 (2000); Magness, supra
note 1, at 431.
8 Khan, supra note 1, at 716.
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be an unworkable standard in detecting and obviating predatory
pricing schemes, particularly when the defendant company operates across several complex and interrelated markets.9 Airline
industry cases provide a clear example of this shortcoming and
demonstrate the changes needed to curtail anticompetitive conduct effectively.10 These cases also show that failure to implement necessary changes will likely allow antitrust violations to
continue unfettered in industries with similarly complex markets, such as the e-commerce industry.11 Furthermore, allowing
these violations to continue creates poor incentives for businesses and thwarts the goals of antitrust law as a whole. In short,
the overly restrictive Brooke Group test, with its focus on marginal
cost, has created “a defendant’s paradise” that rewards rather
than curbs anticompetitive behavior.12
This Comment will begin with background on antitrust law
generally and the influences that have shaped it and background on predatory pricing as a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. It will then explore predatory pricing in the airline
industry to illustrate the exceptional difficulties imposed by the
Brooke Group test. Next, it will compare the airline and e-commerce industries to demonstrate that suits brought against the ecommerce giants are very likely to suffer from the same fatal
flaws as those brought against major airlines under current law.
Finally, this Comment will propose an alternative test that will
allow for proper—and necessary—enforcement of the antitrust
laws.
II.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTITRUST LAW

The goals of early antitrust law were somewhat nebulous and
ill-defined at the outset;13 however, many scholars note that the
aim of these laws centered around breaking up the trusts and
cartels that threatened principles of free trade and economic
liberty.14 These trusts, powerful entities created by acquiring
See Bolton et al., supra note 7, at 2258–59; Magness, supra note 1, at 431, 435.
See Hemphill & Weiser, supra note 6, at 2065.
11 See Khan, supra note 1, at 717.
12 Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87
YALE L.J. 284, 305 (1977).
13 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
7 (1978).
14 See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 288–98 (1989), as reprinted in C. PAUL ROGERS III & WILLIAM R. ANDERSEN, ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY
AND PRACTICE 7, 7–12 (5th ed. 2020); see also Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H.
9

10
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multiple businesses in a given industry, were formed to amass
broad control of a product or service’s distribution and production.15 Similarly, producers and sellers formed cartels to control
the production or price of a product.16 The business practices of
these entities were strategically adopted to establish control of
market prices and the relevant market itself, which demonstrated the danger of consolidating too much power into a single entity in a given market.17 The infamous Standard Oil
Company is a classic example. Standard Oil controlled ten percent of the oil-refining industry in the U.S. when it was incorporated in 1870, but by the early 1900s, it had increased its control
of the industry to approximately ninety percent.18 Standard Oil
effectuated this exponential increase in control by acquiring
fourteen companies outright and majority interests in twenty-six
others, all of which were then controlled through the Standard
Oil Trust’s board of trustees.19 Standard Oil used its vast accumulation of market power to set supracompetitive prices in
the markets it monopolized while using profits from those markets to undercut competitors’ prices in remaining markets,
thereby driving those competitors out of business.20
In response to the growing power of trusts and cartels like
Standard Oil, Congress sought to protect “long-established ideals of economic opportunity, security of property, freedom of
exchange, and political liberty” by regulating the formation and
operation of these entities.21 In other words, the bedrock of
early antitrust law was premised on the protection of “basic economic rights and political freedom” from the trusts’ growing
concentration of wealth rather than economic efficiency or consumer welfare.22 During the Sherman Act congressional debates,
Senator Sherman explained that among the problems plaguing
Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405,
2406 (2013).
15 Monopolies and Trusts, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, https://www.encyclopedia.com/
history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/monopolies-and-trusts
[https://perma.cc/C9XF-QVYY].
16 Cartel, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
17 See May, supra note 14, at 9–11.
18 Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85 S.
CAL. L. REV. 605, 609–10 (2012); see Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 32–33 (1911).
19 Orbach & Rebling, supra note 18, at 610–11.
20 Khan, supra note 1, at 723; Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 42–43.
21 May, supra note 14, at 7.
22 Id. at 8.
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the “popular mind” at the time, none was more pressing than
“the inequality of condition, of wealth, and opportunity that has
grown within a single generation out of the concentration of
capital into vast combinations to control production and trade
and to break down competition.”23 He opined that, without congressional action to address the problem, “there will soon be a
trust for every production and a master to fix the price for every
necessity of life.”24 The Supreme Court later echoed this sentiment in the Standard Oil case, noting that the Sherman Act was
intended to address “the widespread impression that [the
trusts’] power had been and would be exerted to oppress individuals and injure the public generally.”25
Conversely, Congress was also concerned with the Sherman
Act’s potential for chilling legitimate competition,26 which is a
theme that continues to influence antitrust jurisprudence today.27 It was against this backdrop that the term “monopoly” was
defined as encompassing “situations of market dominance
achieved through private or governmental activity that artificially impeded free competition.”28 Early advocates of restricting
anticompetitive behavior recognized that not all successful business ventures were established by utilizing anticompetitive measures and, thus, that these businesses would not be proper
targets of antitrust law.29 The view was that “a man who merely
by superior skill and intelligence . . . got the whole business because nobody could do it as well as he could was not a monopolist,” rather, a monopoly “involved something like the use of
means which made it impossible for other persons to engage in
fair competition.”30 However, these considerations were sidelined by the “big is necessarily bad” approach that permeated
the debates and early interpretations of the antitrust law.31
21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890) (statement of Sen. John Sherman).
Id.
25 Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 50.
26 Id. at 90.
27 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
223–24 (1993); United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1116 (10th Cir.
2003).
28 May, supra note 14, at 10.
29 Id.
30 21 CONG. REC. 3152 (1890) (statement of Sen. George Hoar).
31 ROGERS & ANDERSEN, supra note 14, at 29; cf. H.R. REP. NO. 63-627, at 19
(1914) (“The concentration of wealth, money, and property in the United States
under the control and in the hands of a few individuals or great corporations has
grown to such an enormous extent that unless checked it will ultimately threaten
the perpetuity of our institutions.”). See generally LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, Shall We
23
24
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The courts began interpreting the Sherman Act provisions
and their proper scope in light of these early theories and sentiments, which was no small task due to the Act’s broad language
and lack of clearly defined terms.32 In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, the Supreme Court first interpreted § 1 of the
Sherman Act, which prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade.”33 The Court adopted an expansive view of Section 1,
holding that the provision’s key phrase “contract in restraint of
trade” encompassed not only unreasonable restraints of trade but
rather “all contracts . . . and no exception or limitation can be
added without placing in the [A]ct that which has been omitted
by [C]ongress.”34 Just one year later, the Court clarified that the
effect of the Trans-Missouri decision was not to “render illegal
most business contracts or combinations . . . because . . . they all
restrain trade in some remote and indirect degree,” and emphasized that such an interpretation would be “to make a most violent assumption, and one not called for or justified by the
decision mentioned, or by any other decision of this court.”35
In the landmark case Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States,36 the Supreme Court began laying the groundwork for future interpretations of § 2 of the Sherman Act. Section 2 prohibits the monopolization of “any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations.”37 The Standard Oil Court opined that Section 2 extended the reach of Section 1 to “a[ny] attempt[ ] to reach the end prohibited by the
[first] section” and held that the proper determining factor in
distinguishing illegal restraints of trade from valid restraints “is
the rule of reason guided by the established law and by the plain
Abandon the Policy of Competition?, in THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PALOUIS D. BRANDEIS 104, 114–15 (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., 1934).
32 ROGERS & ANDERSEN, supra note 14, at 13 (citing WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND
ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT
95–99 (1965)) (noting that Congress intentionally gave deference to the courts
in interpreting the Sherman Act).
33 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897).
34 Id. at 328 (emphasis added).
35 United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898); see also Anderson v. United States, 171 U.S. 604, 616 (1898) (adopting a test for illegal restraints of trade to determine whether the anticompetitive effect of the restraint
was direct or “indirect and incidental”); ROGERS & ANDERSEN, supra note 14, at
18.
36 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
37 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 2).
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duty to enforce the prohibitions of the act and thus the public
policy which its restrictions were obviously enacted to subserve.”38 The Court also emphasized the importance of “the individual right to contract, when not unduly or improperly
exercised” as the most efficient check on the exercise of monopoly power.39 Despite this recognition, the Court later continued
to interpret the Sherman Act’s prohibitions “so broadly that a
wide range of conduct sufficed to create liability for dominant
firms.”40 The expansive liability created by these overly broad
interpretations, among other factors, subsequently prompted an
overcorrection in the law as the Court sought to narrow the
Sherman Act’s reach and avoid unnecessarily punishing competitive conduct.
Competing economic theories and analyses developed by
“Harvard School” and “Chicago School” scholars also heavily influenced the modern contours of antitrust policy and the practical applications of the law.41 The Harvard School, which
included scholars such as Philip Areeda, Donald Turner, and
Carl Kaysen, stressed the importance of industrial organization
and market structures, such as market concentration and entry
barriers, as significant factors in preserving competitive markets.42 In contrast, the Chicago School, including scholars Richard Posner and Robert Bork, emphasized consumer welfare,
measured in terms of allocative and productive efficiency and
viewed through the lens of price theory, as the proper goal of
the antitrust laws.43 Additionally, these scholars viewed the market structures at the center of the Harvard School’s analysis as
the result of firm performance rather than the cause, meaning
that a given firm’s dominance is more likely the result of efficient business practices rather than anticompetitive behavior
Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 61–62.
Id. at 62.
40 William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for
Dominant Firm Conduct: The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 1, 17 (2007). See generally United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d
416 (2nd Cir. 1945); Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
41 Kovacic, supra note 40, at 14–15.
42 William G. Shepherd, Economic Analysis to Guide Antitrust Enforcement: Prospects for Section 2, 35 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 917, 919–20 (1990); ROGERS & ANDERSEN,
supra note 14, at 27. See generally CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST
POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1959).
43 ROGERS & ANDERSEN, supra note 14, at 27–29; Khan, supra note 1, at 722,
730. See generally BORK, supra note 13.
38
39
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under this theory.44 The Chicago School, in particular, had a
profound influence on the development of the law during the
1960s and 1970s, as evidenced by the Court’s adoption of the
School’s theories in pinpointing violations of the antitrust
laws.45
III.

SHERMAN ACT SECTION 2, PREDATORY PRICING,
AND THE CREATION OF A “DEFENDANT’S
PARADISE”

Predatory pricing is addressed both in the Robinson-Patman
Act and § 2 of the Sherman Act.46 Section 2 of the Sherman Act
generally prohibits establishing, attempting to establish, or
maintaining a monopoly in any part of interstate trade or commerce.47 A successful Section 2 claim requires proof of “(1) the
possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2)
the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”48
Specifically, the plaintiff must show that the defendant has engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct with the specific
intent to monopolize the relevant market and a dangerous
probability of achieving monopoly power.49 In contrast, the
Robinson-Patman Act’s prohibitions focus on price discrimination to lessen competition substantially or create a monopoly.50
Shepherd, supra note 42, at 922–23.
See Kovacic, supra note 40, at 21–26; Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of
Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925, 932 (1979); see also Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting BORK, supra note 13, at 66) (referring
to the Sherman Act as a “consumer welfare prescription”); Khan, supra note 1, at
720–21, 721 n.39.
46 See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
222 (1993).
47 “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony . . . .” Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 2, 26 Stat. 209
(current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2).
48 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
49 See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458–59 (1993).
50 Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). Price discrimination refers to
“[t]he practice of offering identical or similar goods to different buyers at different prices when the costs of producing the goods are the same.” Price Discrimination, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
44
45
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While these laws differ in some respects,51 an important distinction between the two is that the Robinson-Patman Act only
applies to commodities, not services.52 Otherwise, certain kinds
of price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act and violations of Section 2 generally are analyzed in the same way because “the essence of the claim under either statute is the same:
A business rival has priced its products in an unfair manner with
an object to eliminate or retard competition and thereby gain
and exercise control over prices in the relevant market.”53 With
that in mind, this Comment will further analyze the various influences that have shaped Section 2 predatory pricing law over
the decades.
The influence of the Harvard and Chicago Schools’ competing economic theories played a pivotal role not only in the development of antitrust policy in general but also in the
development of predatory pricing law.54 From the outset, the
Harvard School exerted considerable influence on courts’ early
attempts to distill a distinction between competitive and anticompetitive pricing.55 As a result, “[t]he pre-1975 legal standard for predatory pricing hinged on two factors—unfair use of
pricing power against new entrants or smaller firms, and protection of long run market competitiveness viewed primarily in
terms of market structure.”56 Thus, the courts were focused on
structural competitiveness as the goal of the Sherman Act while
paying little or no attention to economic efficiency concerns.57
The emphasis on structural competition boiled down to two
elements of the predatory pricing offense: evidence of market
power in the relevant market and intent to use predatory pricing as a way to increase or maintain market power.58 Market
power, sometimes referred to as monopoly power, is defined as
51 Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222 (explaining that Sherman Act Section 2 claims
must meet the standard of “a dangerous probability of actual monopolization,”
whereas the standard under the Robinson-Patman Act requires only “‘a reasonable possibility’ of substantial injury to competition”).
52 Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a).
53 Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222.
54 See Nicola Giocoli, Games Judges Don’t Play: Predatory Pricing and Strategic Reasoning in U.S. Antitrust, 21 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 271, 280–81 (2013).
55 Id. at 279–80.
56 Id. at 274 (citing Joseph F. Brodley & George A. Hay, Predatory Pricing: Competing Economic Theories and the Evolution of Legal Standards, 66 CORNELL L. REV.
738, 755–56 (1981)).
57 Id. (citing Brodley & Hay, supra note 56, at 755–56).
58 Id.; see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
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“the power to control prices or exclude competition.”59 Such
market power can usually be inferred from a firm’s dominant
market share once the court defines the relevant market.60 Economic considerations, such as efficiency and the relationship between price and cost, were not considered in evaluating
predatory pricing complaints at the time; instead, the Court
adopted a per se rule of illegality (if both of the above elements
were met) that resulted in shaky and broadly drawn inferences
of predatory behavior.61 The Court defended its broad use of
the per se rule by asserting that alternative, more fact-intensive
approaches would “leave courts free to ramble through the wilds
of economic theory.”62 Notably, the Court’s reluctance to explore relevant economic theory resulted in the precise chilling
effect on pro-competitive behavior that had been cautioned
against for decades, as well as the law’s later overcorrection to
very narrow predatory pricing liability.63
Specifically, the Court’s strict approach resulted in defendants losing predatory pricing cases roughly seventy-five percent
of the time.64 This phenomenon was met with scholarly criticism
on all sides of the aisle, including Donald F. Turner and Phillip
Areeda’s highly influential article advocating for a new, more
workable rule.65 Areeda and Turner argued that there were two
main defects in predatory pricing theory: (1) failure to clearly
define what constitutes the offense; and (2) exaggerated fears
that monopolists will engage in predatory pricing in the first
place.66 Ultimately, they aimed to fix these issues by proposing
that courts use marginal cost as the benchmark for the “belowcost” pricing element.67 “Marginal cost is the increment to total
cost that results from producing an additional increment of out59 Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours
& Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956)).
60 Id.
61 Giocoli, supra note 54, at 274–75.
62 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972).
63 See id. at 609–10; Giocoli, supra note 54, at 275 (“[T]he ghost of killing
‘good’ competition has haunted the whole history of anti-[predatory pricing] enforcement and has been the underlying argument in all of its critiques.”).
64 Giocoli, supra note 54, at 280–81 (citing R.H. Koller II, The Myth of Predatory
Pricing: An Empirical Study, 4 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 105, 110 (1971) (finding
that 95 out of 123 federal predatory pricing cases were decided against the
defendant)).
65 See generally Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
66 Id. at 697–98.
67 Id. at 702–03.
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put” and is used because firms consider “incremental effects on
revenues and costs” when making a profit-maximizing decision
such as a price cut.68 Thus, Areeda and Turner “concluded that
marginal-cost pricing is the economically sound division between acceptable, competitive behavior and ‘below-cost’ predation.”69 They argued that there should be no prohibition on
pricing at or above “reasonably anticipated” marginal cost because this practice leads to the proper allocation of resources
and is consistent with competition on the merits.70 However,
they asserted that “the presumption of illegality for prices below
both marginal and average cost should be conclusive,” as
neither of the aforementioned benefits arises when prices are
set below marginal cost.71
Areeda and Turner’s test ultimately replaced marginal cost
with average variable cost marginal cost can be particularly difficult to define in practice and average variable cost is a close approximation that a court can more practically determine.72 The
final rule recommended that prices at or above reasonably anticipated average variable cost be “conclusively presumed lawful,”
while prices below reasonably anticipated average variable cost
should be “conclusively presumed unlawful.”73 The Areeda-Turner test “conquered [U.S. courts] as completely as the Holy Inquisition conquered Spain.”74 Courts were eager to apply the
user-friendly test to complex predatory pricing cases—most
likely as a means to avoid “rambl[ing] through the wilds of economic theory”75—and defendants’ luck began to change as a result.76 In conjunction with that change, judicial avoidance of
economic considerations had the effect not of stifling legitimate
Id. at 700–02 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 716.
70 Id. at 712, 715 (“[T]o establish predatory pricing, it should be necessary to
show that a monopolist has priced both below immediate marginal cost and below the marginal cost at the output which he reasonably anticipated he would
attain within a reasonable period of time.”).
71 Id. at 713.
72 Id. at 716–17, 732–33. “[A]verage variable cost is the sum of all variable costs
divided by output.” Id. at 700; see Giocoli, supra note 54, at 280.
73 Areeda & Turner, supra note 65, at 733.
74 Giocoli, supra note 54, at 280 (alteration in original) (citing JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 32 (1936)).
75 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
76 Giocoli, supra note 54, at 280–81 (citing Bolton et al., supra note 7, at
2253–54) (noting that plaintiffs lost every predatory pricing case brought between 1975 and 1980).
68
69
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competition but stifling legitimate claims of anticompetitive
behavior.77
It is for this reason that the rule was widely criticized as an
over-simplification of a complex issue.78 Scholars argued that, in
practice, the Areeda-Turner test “holds dominant firm pricing
per se legal,”79 effectively making it impossible for plaintiffs to
establish the elements of a predatory pricing claim.80 Areeda
and Turner were also criticized for the rule’s failure to address
the strategic considerations that might cause a firm to engage in
predatory pricing.81 For instance, one critique pointed out that
the pair’s allocative efficiency theory does not distinguish between continuous marginal cost pricing and temporary price
cuts adopted for strategic purposes.82 This is problematic for a
few reasons. Marginal costs can be a poor indicator of both total
and unit costs in the first place,83 meaning that the rule designed to detect below-cost pricing may not accurately capture a
firm’s actual costs in some cases. Further, strategic, short-term
marginal cost pricing carries negligible immediate benefits and
long-run resource misallocations, which refutes Areeda and Turner’s theory that “[t]he firm maximizes profit when price . . . is
equal to marginal cost . . . .”84 To illustrate, if a company temporarily cuts prices as a competitive strategy, but its customers mistakenly believe the price reduction is permanent, they may
change their consumption practices and incur extra costs, resulting in negligible social benefits not captured by the rule.85
Therefore, the rule is not properly equipped to capture the intertemporal and strategic considerations that must be considered in the predatory pricing analysis.86
77 See Williamson, supra note 12, at 305 (calling the shift in predatory pricing
theory “a defendant’s paradise”).
78 See F. M. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 868, 883, 890 (1976) (arguing that courts must conduct an examination
of the facts of a particular case, along with intent and market structure, in determining whether a defendant is engaged in predatory pricing); Giocoli, supra note
54, at 282.
79 Giocoli, supra note 54, at 284 (quoting Brodley & Hay, supra note 56, at
793).
80 See id.
81 See Williamson, supra note 12, at 289; Giocoli, supra note 54, at 286.
82 Giocoli, supra note 54, at 289–90.
83 Id. at 290.
84 Areeda and Turner, supra note 65, at 702.
85 See Giocoli, supra note 54, at 285–86, 290–91.
86 Id. at 286.
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Oliver Williamson, whose work exposed the rule’s lack of strategic and intertemporal components, also emphasized that longheld beliefs about predatory pricing—especially the belief that
the practice is irrational and unlikely to occur except in the rarest of circumstances87—simply did not ring true in application.88
The crux of Williamson’s argument rested on the theory that
when strategic and intertemporal considerations are given the
proper weight, various circumstances exist under which predatory pricing might prove to be a profitable—and rational—business decision.89 As Richard Posner acknowledged, “[e]liminate
strategic considerations, and it becomes impossible to construct
a rational motivation for predatory pricing [and] . . . to ignore
strategic considerations is not satisfactory.”90 Thus, a test that ignores these considerations does not allow courts adequate discretion to conduct the fact-intensive inquiry necessary to
distinguish an anticompetitive pricing strategy from a pro-competitive one.91
Other scholars agreed that strategic considerations are crucial
to the predatory pricing analysis,92 which resulted in some
courts utilizing an “Augmented Areeda-Turner Rule” approach.93 Under the augmented rule, prices above average total
cost were considered lawful, prices below average variable cost
were considered unlawful, and prices between average total cost
and average variable cost were presumptively lawful, subject to
rebuttal evidence of predatory intent and market structure.94
Plaintiffs in augmented-rule jurisdictions succeeded on predatory pricing claims roughly seventeen percent of the time.95
However, the majority of federal courts largely ignored the ever87 See BORK, supra note 13, at 155. See generally John S. McGee, Predatory Price
Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958) (using empirical
evidence to argue that Standard Oil was not engaged in predatory pricing practices and that a rational business would never find a price war to be a profitable
strategy). McGee’s empirical findings have been widely called into question. See,
e.g., Elizabeth Granitz & Benjamin Klein, Monopolization by “Raising Rivals’ Costs”:
The Standard Oil Case, 39 J.L. & ECON. 1, 23 (1996).
88 Williamson, supra note 12, at 286–87; see Giocoli, supra note 54, at 287.
89 Williamson, supra note 12, at 285, 287.
90 Posner, supra note 45, at 939.
91 See Williamson, supra note 12, at 287–92; Giocoli, supra note 54, at 287.
92 Giocoli, supra note 54, at 288–90.
93 Bolton et al., supra note 7, at 2253.
94 Giocoli, supra note 54, at 291.
95 Id. (citing Bolton et al., supra note 7, at 2254).
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increasing scholarship advocating for such an approach.96 Similarly overlooking developments in economic theory, the Supreme Court would soon tip the balance back in favor of
predatory pricing defendants.97
This shift began in the Matsushita case, where the Court embraced the importance of the price–cost relationship in the
predatory pricing framework for the first time.98 In doing so, the
Court also adopted a strict evidentiary standard for these claims.
In addition to showing that the defendant set its prices below its
costs (i.e., that the defendant was intentionally incurring shortterm losses), the plaintiffs would also need to demonstrate that
the defendant would subsequently wield enough power in the
relevant market to recoup those losses and gain additional profits through long-term supracompetitive pricing.99 Although the
Court had finally incorporated relevant economic concepts into
its analysis, its opinion explicitly adhered to the outdated argument that predatory pricing schemes are inherently irrational,
and thus “are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful,” despite a growing consensus to the contrary.100
Matsushita set the stage for the Court’s holding in Brooke
Group, which put the proverbial nail in the coffin for plaintiffs
alleging predatory pricing violations. The Brooke Group Court
again reaffirmed that the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the
prices at issue are below the defendant’s costs, usually determined by some variation of the Areeda-Turner test (i.e., by comparing the allegedly predatory prices to the firm’s average
variable costs).101 Interestingly, the Court declined to define the
appropriate cost measure in this context because the parties had
agreed to use average variable cost.102 Thus, although the Court
signaled approval of the Areeda-Turner test, it did not mandate
96 See generally Chris Sagers, “Rarely Tried, and . . . Rarely Successful”: Theoretically
Impossible Price Predation Among the Airlines, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 919 (2009).
97 See generally id.; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 588–92 (1986); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 222–229 (1993).
98 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588–92.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 589 (citing BORK, supra note 13, at 149–55; Areeda & Turner, supra
note 65, at 699; Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48
U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 (1981)); Sagers, supra note 96, at 920; Williamson, supra
note 12, at 287–93; Posner, supra note 45, at 939. See generally Paul L. Joskow &
Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J.
213 (1979); Brodley & Hay, supra note 56.
101 Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222. See generally Areeda & Turner, supra note 65.
102 See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222 n.1.
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its use.103 The Court also rejected the theory that predatory pricing could be demonstrated by showing that a firm’s prices were
above its costs but below its competitor’s costs or the general
price levels in the market.104 In doing so, the Court announced
a general rule that above-cost pricing reflects either “the lower
cost structure of the alleged predator, and so represents competition on the merits or is beyond the practical ability of a judicial
tribunal to control without courting intolerable risks of chilling
legitimate price cutting.”105 Of course, it may be true that abovecost pricing of this sort reflects an edge gained through efficiency and lawful competition; however, the Court’s blanket
rule assumes that all predatory pricing schemes take the form of
an explicit below-cost price cut.106 Williamson demonstrated
that a firm could achieve the same desired end using different
means.107 For example, by building up excess capacity in anticipation of a new entrant to the market and then flooding the
market’s supply upon entry, a company could lower the market
price enough to push the new competitor out of the market entirely.108 The Court’s fear of chilling legitimate business practices thus created a carve-out in the below-cost requirement that
insulates defendants from liability.
In addition, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs must
prove that the defendant had a dangerous probability of recouping its investment in the below-cost pricing scheme through
supracompetitive profits in the relevant market.109 The recoupment prong further breaks down into separate requirements.
First, the pricing scheme must be capable of actually achieving
the intended goal.110 This analysis “requires an understanding
of the extent and duration of the alleged predation, the relative
financial strength of the predator and its intended victim, and
their respective incentives and will.”111 Next, the plaintiffs must
show that the below-cost pricing “would likely injure competi103 See id. at 224 (providing the Areeda and Turner’s proposed below-cost rule
in dicta).
104 Id. at 223; see also Atlantic Richfield Co v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328,
340 (1990).
105 Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 223.
106 See id. at 223–24.
107 Williamson, supra note 12, at 335.
108 Id.
109 Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 224; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588–89 (1986).
110 Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 225.
111 Id.; see Areeda & Turner, supra note 65, at 710.
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tion in the relevant market.”112 However, “[e]vidence of belowcost pricing is not alone sufficient to permit an inference of
probable recoupment and injury to competition.”113 Instead, evidence of likely competitive harm “requires an estimate of the
cost of the alleged predation and a close analysis of both the
scheme alleged by the plaintiff and the structure and conditions
of the relevant market.”114
The Court’s reasoning assumes that only successful predation
schemes can be harmful, while unsuccessful schemes simply result in lower prices for consumers.115 This analysis is flawed, or
at least incomplete, for a few reasons. First, the Court’s “selective
evaluation of the academic literature” led it to formulate a rule
that relies on controversial theories and inadequate empirical
support.116 The Court also failed to consider that failed predatory pricing schemes can still be harmful; for example, these
schemes have distortive effects in the market.117 It also did not
address how it reached the conclusion that false positives in this
context would chill pro-competitive pricing decisions. Importantly, experts have found that this theory does not hold water
when the predation seeks primarily to exclude competitors
rather than to recoup excess profits from the price cut.118 Finally, the below-cost and recoupment tests operate in isolation
rather than working in conjunction to identify violations.119 The
Brooke Group test as a whole would be better equipped to detect
predatory pricing if evidence of recoupment informed the below-cost analysis and vice versa.120
The Court itself also recognized the difficulty of establishing
these elements.121 However, it emphasized that predatory pricing is a rare practice that closely mimics the lowering of prices to
stimulate competition rather than injure it; therefore, drawing
mistaken inferences “chill[s] the very conduct the antitrust laws
are designed to protect” and justifies such a high bar to recovBrooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 225.
Id. at 226.
114 Id.
115 Hemphill & Weiser, supra note 6, at 2054.
116 Id. at 2053.
117 Id. at 2054.
118 Id. (citing Louis Kaplow, Recoupment, Market Power, and Predatory Pricing, 82
ANTITRUST L.J. 167 (2018)).
119 See id. at 2055.
120 Id. at 2055–56.
121 Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226
(1993).
112
113
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ery.122 The Court further stated that “[i]t would be ironic indeed if the standards for predatory pricing liability were so low
that antitrust suits themselves became a tool for keeping prices
high.”123 The Court certainly is not wrong on this point. But its
insistence on avoiding false positives at the expense of effectively
barring legitimate claims produces an equally ironic result: the
standards for liability are now so high that antitrust law has become a tool for protecting anticompetitive conduct.
Proponents of the Brooke Group test echo the Court’s justifications and argue that using a more complex test would further
complicate antitrust cases that, by nature, are already extremely
fact-intensive and costly, both in terms of money and time.124
Therefore, a reliable test requiring a relatively simple application allows courts to avoid “the evil committed by earlier decisions,” namely, punishing pro-competitive behavior through the
use of a vague and overbroad standard.125 Again, these are certainly valid points. However, the application of the Brooke Group
test gives broad protection to defendants where empirical evidence shows actual use of anticompetitive tactics.126 This application unacceptably protects monopolists, harms consumers,
and thwarts the goals of antitrust law as a whole. Indeed, the
Sherman Act was enacted to protect the competitive process from
anticompetitive business practices127—the transformation of
predatory pricing law into a liability shield for businesses seeking to destroy competition strongly suggests that the Court’s interpretations have missed the forest for the trees.

Id.
Id. at 226–27.
124 See Giocoli, supra note 54, at 282 (discussing academia’s embracement of a
“meaningful and workable” test).
125 Id. at 283 (quoting Herbert Hovenkamp, The Areeda-Turner Treatise in Antitrust Analysis, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 815, 835 (1996)); see Hemphill & Weiser, supra
note 6, at 2052–53.
126 See James A. Brander & Anming Zhang, Market Conduct in the Airline Industry:
An Empirical Investigation, 21 RAND J. ECON. 567, 580 (1990); Sagers, supra note
96, at 923–26.
127 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458 (1993) (“The purpose of the [Sherman] Act is not to protect businesses from the working of the
market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the market. The law directs
itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself.”).
122
123
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PREDATORY PRICING IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

STRUCTURE

AND

CHARACTERISTICS

OF THE

AIRLINE INDUSTRY

Predatory pricing allegations in the airline industry provide a
particularly illustrative case study of the failings of the Brooke
Group test.128 In the era following airline deregulation, fervent
allegations of predatory pricing have been raised by competitors129 and investigated by the U.S. government.130 Some studies
have even found evidence of predation among the airlines.131
Despite this evidence, plaintiffs have been unable to prove predatory pricing violations since the adoption of the Brooke Group
test.132 Violations are nearly “impossible to prove without direct,
smoking-gun evidence” in this context, in part because of the
role of deregulation in shaping the industry’s structure and
characteristics.133
The early airline industry developed substantially under the
Hoover Administration’s policy of industry self-regulation.134 At
this time, the industry was also financially dependent upon federal subsidies.135 Walter Folger Brown, then-Postmaster General,
“used a broad statutory discretion to award federal mail contracts—on which the industry was then dependent for its very
life—and used that discretion to force the existing major carriers to divide the country’s available passenger traffic among
128 Sagers, supra note 96, at 924–25 (citing Aviation Competition Hearing: Before
the Subcomm. on Aviation of the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 105th Cong. 1067
(1998) (statement of Alfred Kahn); Stephan P. Brady & William A. Cunningham,
Exploring Predatory Pricing in the Airline Industry, TRANSP. J., Fall 2011, at 5). See
generally Hemphill & Weiser, supra note 6.
129 Sagers, supra note 96, at 944 (citing In re Air Passenger Comput. Rsrvs. Sys.
Antitrust Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1443, 1475–76 (C.D. Cal. 1988)); see Cont’l Airlines,
Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 689, 692–93 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
130 See United States v. AMR Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1144 (D. Kan. 2001);
Sagers, supra note 96, at 924 (citing OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPT. OF TRANSP.,
ENFORCEMENT POLICY REGARDING UNFAIR EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT IN THE AIR
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ON THE ECONOMIC, POLICY, AND LEGAL ISSUES (2001); OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPT. OF TRANSP., STATEMENT OF THE ENFORCEMENT POLICY REGARDING UNFAIR EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT
(1998)).
131 Sagers, supra note 96, at 938; Thomas Gale Moore, U.S. Airline Deregulation:
Its Effects on Passengers, Capital, and Labor, 29 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1–2 (1986)).
132 See Hemphill & Weiser, supra note 6, at 2049, 2064–68 (discussing that the
result varies from case to case); Sagers, supra note 96, at 922, 927.
133 Sagers, supra note 96, at 927, 936–44; see Peggy J. Hoyt, Comment, Developing Antitrust Policy on the Internet: Lessons from the Airline Industry, 28 TRANSP. L.J.
315, 315 (2001).
134 Sagers, supra note 96, at 936.
135 Id. at 936–37.
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themselves.”136 These divisions were agreed to in secret, which
prompted a backlash that spurred the creation of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) and decreased federal subsidies to the airlines.137 The CAB support kept airlines operating at profitable
levels despite the dip in federal subsidies, and airlines came to
depend on the Board’s assistance to stay afloat.138 The CAB was
phased out of existence during deregulation in the late 1970s,
and a new era of intense competition came about as a response
to the sudden lack of federal aid that the industry had been dependent upon since its inception.139
During the early years of deregulation, which was undertaken
to increase competition and make airline services cheaper for
consumers, the industry was flooded with new entrants and aggressive competition.140 This period was also punctuated by strategic reorganizations and acquisitions of smaller, new entrants
and competitors.141 Even major airlines, like PanAm, TWA, Eastern, and Braniff, either failed or were acquired by the surviving
carriers during this time.142 Thus, the industry’s hallmark—aggressive competition—began to take hold as airlines struggled
to survive in a deregulated industry.143 However, this competition also resulted in significant cost savings for consumers and
spurred the transition to the industry’s hub-and-spoke structure,
which remains in place today.144 In this structure, high-traffic
airports are the “hubs” where planes arrive frequently and
where passengers can change planes if their flight have multiple
legs.145 The structure allows airlines to offer more frequent departure flights and increase load factors.146 However, it also allows major airlines to exert considerable influence over the
Id. at 936.
Id. at 937.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 937–39; Fred L. Smith, Jr. & Braden Cox, Airline Deregulation, LIBR.
ECON. & LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/AirlineDeregulation.html [https://perma.cc/HGU9-7MYJ].
140 Sagers, supra note 96, at 937; see Hoyt, supra note 133, at 319–20.
141 Sagers, supra note 96, at 937.
142 Id. at 937, n.81.
143 Id. at 937; see generally Hoyt, supra note 133.
144 Sagers, supra note 96, at 938 (citing Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston,
Intercity Transportation Route Structures Under Deregulation: Some Assessments Motivated by the Airline Experience, 75 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 57, 59 (1985)).
145 Passenger Terminal Layout and Design: Passenger Requirements, https://
www.britannica.com/technology/airport/Passenger-terminal-layout-and-design
[https://perma.cc/SKT3-P4UD].
146 Id.
136
137
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operation of hubs where they hold monopolies—often to the
detriment of low-cost carriers.147
In the 1990s, there was a fresh wave of new entrants into the
industry, primarily due to both Southwest Airlines’ success as a
low-cost carrier and a renewed spike in acquisition activity as the
airlines navigated the end of a short period of record profitability.148 Most new entrants failed or were acquired, sparking allegations of predation toward smaller competitors and low-cost
carriers.149 Since that time, most airline carriers have struggled
to operate at profitable levels and have continued using aggressive tactics to try to counteract less-than-stellar financial
performance.150
The structure of the deregulated airline industry and its related market characteristics—along with the substantial obstacles posed by the Brooke Group test151—have allowed major
airlines to engage in predatory behavior as a means of limiting
the competitive threat posed by low-cost carriers.152 In this context, predation typically takes the form of a major airline responding to low-cost carrier entry by dropping prices and
increasing capacity on the routes it monopolizes.153 The low-cost
carrier is then forced to leave the market, and the major airline
is free to resume normal pricing and capacity, having displaced
the other discouraged, low-cost carriers from entering the
market.154
For starters, the industry’s hub-and-spoke structure facilitates
the major carriers’ maintenance of market power in part because specific city-pair routes are “highly insulated from geographic competition.”155 This, in turn, creates substantial
barriers to entry for small competitors seeking to establish hubs
See Hemphill & Weiser, supra note 6, at 2049.
Sagers, supra note 96, at 939.
149 Id. at 941.
150 See id. at 939–40.
151 See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text (providing background for
the Brooke Group test).
152 See Hemphill & Weiser, supra note 6, at 2049.
153 Id.; Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm
Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 417 (1987).
154 Hemphill & Weiser, supra note 6, at 2049.
155 Sagers, supra note 96, at 948; see Russell A. Klingaman, Predatory Pricing and
Other Exclusionary Conduct in the Airline Industry: Is Antitrust Law the Solution?, 4
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 281, 282 (1992) (stating that the top five carriers transported
sixty-nine percent of all passengers in 1978 and seventy-three percent of all passengers by 1990).
147
148

518

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[86

in markets already controlled by major airlines.156 This structure
also plays a role in the major airlines’ vertical integration of regional carriers to supply additional traffic to hub networks and
“to forestall the growth of would-be entrants.”157
Other substantial barriers to entry include limited airport facilities and capacity, significant information costs, and highfixed costs associated with industry entry and airline operation.158 Constrained airport capacity poses an issue for new entrants because limited access to airport facilities effectively
prevents them from entering the market in the first place.159 Capacity issues are caused in part by government ownership of
most commercial airports, as well as from lower consumer fares
and increased air traffic prompted by deregulation.160 However,
anticompetitive behavior also perpetuates the problem. Specifically, major airlines have pressured airport operators to avoid
“support[ing] needed expansion and . . . develop[ing] marketbased means for apportioning facilities in a pro-competitive
fashion.”161
Branding and customer loyalty are leading drivers of high information costs because they are crucial to an airline’s profitability.162 Consumers are often ill-equipped to purchase tickets
based on service quality because purchases are made before the
consumer even sets foot on the plane.163 As a result, purchases
depend on “consumer confidence in reliability and safety,”
meaning that airlines must spend considerable resources cultivating brand recognition and customer loyalty to be
profitable.164
High-fixed costs of operation also pose significant difficulties
for new entrants and motivate the incumbent airlines to compete aggressively to maintain market power and profitability.
Notably, large and small airlines alike are plagued by huge fixed
costs and inefficient capital structures, due in part to the costs of
Sagers, supra note 96, at 941; see Klingaman, supra note 155, at 288.
Sagers, supra note 96, at 944–45.
158 Id. at 943–44 (citing Levine, supra note 153, at 396); see generally Hoyt, supra
note 133, at 329–43.
159 Sagers, supra note 96, at 943–44.
160 Id. at 943.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 944, 947 (citing Levine, supra note 153, at 426–27).
163 Id. at 943–44.
164 Id.
156
157
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union contracts165 and the fact that the cost of operating a flight
is primarily fixed, regardless of whether the flight in question
takes off with a full cabin or not.166 In fact, “the only major carriers [that were] not in bankruptcy” at the end of 2005 “were
American, Continental, and Southwest.”167 Thus, the dire financial straits common in the industry incentivize airlines to skirt
the law to survive.
Finally, aggressive pricing tactics that shaped the industry after deregulation continue to impact the industry today. The advent of this phenomenon can be traced in part to the use of
computer reservation systems (CRS) beginning in the 1970s.168
Before these systems were made publicly accessible via the internet, CRS usage was limited to the airlines that owned them
and the travel agencies that used them to book flights for customers.169 A handful of the largest domestic carriers owned all
CRS, and agencies typically used only one system, leaving
smaller carriers at a significant disadvantage.170 For example,
during the 1980s, seventy percent of agencies used the systems
owned by United and American, and fifty-seven percent of all
tickets were sold using CRS.171 Inevitably, the larger carriers
abused CRS as an anticompetitive tool, and they “have not denied that their motive was to ensure that all passengers pay as
close as possible to their maximum willingness to pay.”172
Together, these factors make the airline industry a monopolist’s dream. Empirical evidence shows that the structural components discussed facilitate predatory conduct and the
maintenance of market power, as demonstrated by the “significant market share dominance” enjoyed by major airlines “on at
least some routes in their hubs.”173 Other significant markers of
market power include higher fares at concentrated hub airports,
165 Id. at 939–40; cf. Delta Air Lines, Inc., Annual Report 7 (Form 10-K) (Mar.
27, 2006) (stating that several large airlines filed for bankruptcy in 2005, in part
to reduce the costs of collective bargaining).
166 Sagers, supra note 96, at 942.
167 Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Financial Performance of the Airline Industry PostDeregulation, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 421, 428 (2008); see Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra note
165, at 5 (noting that United, US Airways, and ATA Airways, among others, filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy to reduce operating costs).
168 Aimee Minick, Computer Reservations Systems, Airlines, and the Internet, 65 J.
AIR L. & COM. 891, 892 (2000); see generally Hoyt, supra note 133, at 329–43.
169 Levine, supra note 153, at 415; Minick, supra note 168, at 892.
170 Levine, supra note 153, at 415.
171 Id.
172 Sagers, supra note 96, at 942.
173 Id. at 945.
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“oligopolistic pricing where two or more majors dominate a particular route,” and price signaling between major airlines.174 Entry barriers posed by the industry’s hub-and-spoke structure also
support the maintenance of market power.175 Southwest Airlines, for example, is one of only a few low-cost carriers that have
been able to effectively compete with the majors for market
share at the hubs they dominate.176 Specific city-pair routes “are
also highly insulated from geographic competition . . . so airlines are well situated to practice zone pricing to limit predatory
losses.”177 Furthermore, because airlines typically compete with
each other in multiple markets, “[d]eveloping a reputation for
predation in one market might discourage entry in others,
thereby protecting excess profits in several markets with predatory losses in only one.”178 Last but certainly not least, airlines
are not subject to the price discrimination restrictions in the
Robinson-Patman Act because the Act applies only to sales of
commodities—not services.179 This leaves § 2 of the Sherman
Act as the primary check on airline predation, which has been
demonstrably problematic since the introduction of the Brooke
Group test.
Empirical evidence shows not only that airline markets are
susceptible to predatory pricing but that it takes place with regularity.180 In fact, “[i]t is widely accepted that [low-cost carrier]
entry in some airline markets draws swift and drastic incumbent
price reactions, and the observed patterns of those reactions
suggest predatory motives.”181 Evidence of predation is especially observable “if price-cost comparisons are made on incremental basis,” because of the way airlines record this data.182
Incremental basis tests compare the incremental increase in revenue generated by predatory increases in output to the incre174 Id. at 945–46 (citing Severin Borenstein, Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and
Market Power in the U.S. Airline Industry, 20 RAND J. ECON. 344, 344 (1989); Margaret A. Peteraf & Randal Reed, Pricing and Performance in Monopoly Airline Markets, 37 J.L. & ECON. 193, 206, 208 (1994)).
175 See Dempsey, supra note 150, at 457; Sagers, supra note 96, at 940.
176 See Dempsey, supra note 150, at 428; Sagers, supra note 96, at 939.
177 Sagers, supra note 96, at 948 (citing Brander & Zhang, supra note 126, at
571, 580).
178 Id.
179 Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a); see Sagers, supra note 96, at 942
n.104 (explaining that courts broadly hold that transportation is not a
commodity).
180 See Brander & Zhang, supra note 126, at 580–82.
181 Sagers, supra note 96, at 948.
182 Id.
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mental increase in costs generated only by that additional
output.183 This kind of comparison is useful in detecting predatory pricing because “[i]t will frequently be the case that capacity responses to entry that are below-cost on this incremental
basis will appear to be above-cost if the comparison is made on
the basis of the predator’s total output in the market.”184 Two
renowned economists, Joseph Stiglitz and Kenneth Elzinga,
used this comparison to offer expert testimony in Section 2
cases brought against major airlines.185 Even though this testimony showed that the prices in question were “either below cost
in an absolute sense or represented a seriously anticompetitive
profit sacrifice,” neither court adopted the proposed tests.186
B.

FAILINGS

BROOKE GROUP TEST
PREDATORY PRICING SUITS

OF THE

IN

AIRLINE

Given the availability of empirical evidence showing predatory
pricing in the airline industry, many have marveled at the difficulty of proving the violation in court. The root of this problem
lies in the application of the Brooke Group test and the judiciary’s
unwillingness to part with the idea that predatory pricing is
“rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.”187
Several airline predatory pricing cases demonstrate the need
to re-think the Brooke Group test. One such case is Spirit Airlines,
Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,188 in which Spirit brought suit
against Northwest for using anticompetitive methods to keep
Spirit out of Northwest’s hub in Detroit.189 Specifically, Spirit alleged that “Northwest targeted certain of the routes on which it
and Spirit competed and substantially increased capacity and began pricing below Northwest’s average variable cost or its average total cost.”190 Northwest’s predatory conduct included
denying Spirit access to unused gates controlled by Northwest
and/or charging Spirit unreasonable and discriminatory prices
Id. at 948 n.134.
Id. at 948–49 n.134.
185 Id. at 949 & n.135.
186 Id. at 949; see United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1116–17, 1120
(10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting all four tests proposed by the government’s experts
and affirming summary judgment for the defendant); Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw.
Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 938 (6th Cir. 2005) (using the modified Areeda-Turner rule).
187 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986).
188 431 F.3d 917.
189 Id. at 921.
190 Id. at 924 (emphasis omitted).
183
184
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to use those gates . . . [and] threatening to eliminate . . . discounts, promotions or other benefits to companies in
the greater Detroit metropolitan area if those companies designated a carrier other than Northwest for service to or from
Detroit.191

Spirit’s entry into the Detroit–Boston market increased the
route’s capacity and lowered its ticket price, thereby decreasing
Northwest’s associated revenues.192 Because of this, Northwest
responded by “matching Spirit’s $49 one-way fare, and increas[ing] capacity on the city pair.”193 The result of this
scheme, coupled with a similar scheme in the Detroit–Philadelphia market, “produced the result Northwest intended when, by that start of the fourth quarter of 1996, Spirit
was forced to abandon service in both city pairs.”194
This case is notable as the only airline predatory pricing case
where the plaintiffs have succeeded in any meaningful way.195
However, this success was short-lived. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed summary judgment for the defendant, but the
parties settled out of court before the court reached the case’s
merits.196 The court relied heavily on Spirit’s expert testimony in
reversing summary judgment, although the court did not expressly adopt the measure they proposed.197
Specifically, these experts advanced the use of the ElzingaMills test, which “describes the predator’s view of below-cost
pricing as ‘an investment strategy’ ” and looks to “the profit the
firm would earn if the target remained in the market” as the
proper benchmark for calculating “the predator’s reasonably expected gains and losses.”198 The test then breaks down into
three discrete analyses, the first of which was “to compare Northwest’s average fares during the months when Spirit operated its
flights on the [Detroit–Boston] route to the average fares that
would have prevailed on the route, but for Northwest’s alleged
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 923–24.
193 Id. at 924–25 (emphasis omitted).
194 Id. at 925 (emphasis omitted).
195 Sagers, supra note 96, at 953.
196 Id.
197 See Spirit Airlines, 431 F.3d at 937–46, 949–53.
198 Id. at 929–30; Sagers, supra note 96, at 955 n.167 (noting that Elzinga &
Mills’ work was suggested as one possible measure of recoupment that drove the
reasoning in Brooke Group); see Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993).
191
192
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predation” to measure the predator’s financial sacrifice.199 The
next step “compares the average fares Northwest would expect
to charge, during the months immediately after Spirit exited the
market, to the average fares that otherwise would have prevailed
in the market” to determine the return Northwest would reap by
driving Spirit out of the market.200 Finally, the test “compare[s]
the anticipated monthly sacrifice during predation with the anticipated monthly return during recoupment to understand
whether predatory pricing plausibly would have been a profitable option for Northwest to exercise.”201 Using this test, Spirit’s
expert opined that “Northwest had successfully recouped its lost
revenue within months after Spirit’s departure from these
routes.”202 The court agreed that even if the jury found that
Northwest’s prices were set above its average variable cost, “the
jury must also consider the market structure . . . to determine if
Northwest’s deep price discounts in response to Spirit’s entry
and the accompanying expansion of its capacity on these routes
injured competition by causing Spirit’s departure from this market and allowing Northwest to recoup its losses.”203
The court also highlighted a key issue with the Brooke Group
test: the Areeda-Turner rule that many courts have baked into
the test “is an artifact of the cost structure in the airline industry
compared to conventional manufacturing plants envisioned by
Areeda and Turner.”204 In other words, the test was not designed to detect predatory pricing in industries that cannot account for costs using a traditional structure. The below-cost
element provides an example of the burden this imposes on
plaintiffs. Airlines traditionally keep their books in a way that
“facilitate[s] management decision models based on fully allocated costs,” which means that plaintiffs will find it difficult, if
not impossible, to distinguish fixed costs from variable costs.205
Unless plaintiffs can do so in order to allocate an airline’s costs
to certain routes, the Brooke Group test has foreclosed claims for
lack of sufficient evidence of predation.206 However, Spirit demSpirit Airlines, 431 F.3d at 929–30.
Id. at 930.
201 Id. (alteration in original).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 953.
204 Id. at 952.
205 Sagers, supra note 96, at 954; see Michael L. Denger & John A. Herfort,
Predatory Pricing Claims After Brooke Group, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 541, 548–51
(1994).
206 Sagers, supra note 96, at 954.
199
200
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onstrates that if courts allowed plaintiffs to prove predatory pricing based on incremental costs and associated gains, the Brooke
Group test would capture much more of the predatory conduct
occurring in the airline industry.
Another notable case demonstrating these difficulties is United
States v. AMR Corp., where the Department of Justice alleged that
American Airlines used predatory practices to maintain a monopoly of its Dallas–Fort Worth hub.207 The Justice Department’s experts offered “an exceedingly careful, multi-part test”
to show that “American’s flights on the challenged routes were
unprofitable” overall, and that the “costs of the incremental capacity added to combat [low-cost carrier] fares—American added substantial capacity at very low fares—outweighed the
incremental revenue of that added capacity.”208 On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals “rejected this approach wholesale, holding that an airline plaintiff must show that flights as a
whole are unprofitable.”209
The Tenth Circuit’s approach sharply contrasts with the Sixth
Circuit’s willingness to explore relevant market characteristics to
identify predatory pricing not captured by strict interpretations
of the Brooke Group test. The court’s failure to recognize that
showing “flights as a whole are unprofitable” is fundamentally
incompatible with the kind of data available to plaintiffs and
serves as a perfect example of the willingness to sacrifice adequate enforcement in favor of judicial economy.210 In cases involving interrelated markets and non-traditional cost structures,
courts should instead use a dynamic approach to ensure that
predatory pricing schemes and anticompetitive conduct are not
beyond the reproach of the antitrust laws.211

140 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1144 (D. Kan. 2001).
Sagers, supra note 96, at 955; see 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1173–74.
209 Sagers, supra note 96, at 955; see United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109,
1117–20 (10th Cir. 2003), aff’g 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141.
210 Sagers, supra note 96, at 955. Compare AMR Corp., 335 F.3d at 1117–20, with
Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 929–30 (6th Cir. 2005).
211 See supra notes 197–204, 207–209 and accompanying text; Sagers, supra
note 96, at 955 (stating that an incremental-basis test “could properly segregate
the costs because in an airline predation scheme, added capacity will be entirely
or mostly in the lowest fare category.”).
207
208

2021]
V.

A DEFENDANT’S PARADISE

525

IMPLICATIONS OF AIRLINE PREDATORY PRICING
JURISPRUDENCE ON THE E-COMMERCE
INDUSTRY

The issues raised by Brooke Group’s failings in the airline industry also carry significant implications for industries with similar
markets—including the e-commerce industry. The two industries share similarities in structure and market complexity that
demonstrate the need to revisit the Brooke Group test to effectively police anticompetitive behavior. In particular, the ability
of e-commerce giants, such as Amazon and Google, to engage in
predatory pricing in one market and recoup those losses by exercising monopoly power in another closely mirrors the ability
of airline carriers to do so in different flight markets.212
With the advent of a more hands-on regulation of the e-commerce giants, signified by the filing of numerous antitrust lawsuits against these companies,213 the courts must take a more
flexible approach to predatory pricing analysis. Specifically, the
traditional Brooke Group test should be utilized on an incremental-cost basis in oligopolistic industries where individual monopolists dominate certain markets.214
Aggressive price competition is not normally an issue in oligopolistic industries characterized by high concentration and
domination by a few firms.215 In this context, price cuts on one
company’s products force the other market participants to follow suit, thereby reducing the overall market price in the industry but keeping each firm’s market share at the same level.216
This price interdependence, therefore, leads to less price competition.217 However, this is not the case in oligopolistic industries where individual firms hold monopolies in certain markets
protected by high entry barriers.218 This kind of market strucSee generally Hoyt, supra note 133.
See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. LAW OF THE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., REP. ON INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS 6–7 (Comm. Print 2020); Rebecca Klar, Amazon Hit with Antitrust
Lawsuit Alleging E-Book Price Fixing, THE HILL (Jan. 14, 2021, 8:56 PM), https://
thehill.com/policy/technology/534364-amazon-hit-with-class-action-lawsuit-alleg
ing-e-book-price-fixing [https://perma.cc/4MJ9-AMCK].
214 See Hemphill & Weiser, supra note 6, at 2065.
215 See ROGERS & ANDERSEN, supra note 14, at 340.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 See Hemphill & Weiser, supra note 6, at 2065; Khan, supra note 1, at 745
(arguing that focusing on “competitive process and market structure” is the
proper lens for analyzing competition because “the best guardian of competition
212
213
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ture, which characterizes both the airline and e-commerce industries, does not fit well with Brooke Group’s rigid analysis and
provides additional justification for amending the rule.
Several alternative approaches to the predatory pricing test
have been advanced by legal and economic scholars alike,219 but
the incremental-cost tests advanced by the plaintiffs’ experts in
Spirit and AMR Corp.220 appear best-suited to address the unique
nature of the e-commerce and airline industries. These tests allow plaintiffs to present evidence tailored to these industries’
cost and market structures, thus capturing airline and e-commerce firms’ ability to selectively set predatory prices in one
market while recouping those profits in a separate market.
Amazon, well-known for its success despite posting losses year
after year, provides an example.221 When the company first
rolled out its Amazon Prime membership program, estimates
show that Amazon was losing roughly $11 per customer per
year—resulting in an estimated loss of $1 billion to $2 billion
annually.222 However, studies of the Amazon Prime program
show that Prime members, who make up 47% of American consumers, “increase their purchases from Amazon by about 150%”
after purchasing a membership.223 Businesses like Target and
Walmart have been unable to match these numbers,224 which
signifies that Amazon’s market dominance has been spurred, at
least in part, by purposely incurring losses.225
A more flagrant example of predatory pricing not captured by
the current analytical framework is Amazon’s initial “loss leading” policy in the e-book market.226 When Amazon decided to
is a competitive process, and whether a market is competitive is inextricably
linked to . . . how that market is structured”).
219 See generally Tom Campbell & Nirit Sandman, A New Test for Predation: Targeting, 52 UCLA L. REV. 365 (2004); Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper, An
Empirical and Theoretical Comparison of Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV.
655 (1982).
220 See supra notes 197–204, 207–209 and accompanying text.
221 Khan, supra note 1, at 747.
222 Id. at 751.
223 Id. at 751–52.
224 Id. at 752.
225 Id. at 753 (noting that “Amazon’s dominance stems in part from its firstmover advantage as a pioneer of large-scale online commerce” but asserting that
its success is due to “deeply cutting prices and investing heavily in growing its
operations—both at the expense of profits” in important ways).
226 Id. at 756–57, 757 n.240 (first citing United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F.
Supp. 2d 638, 649–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); then citing George Packer, Cheap Words,
NEW YORKER (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/02/
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enter the industry to promote its new Kindle product, it priced
its e-books at $9.99.227 This price was significantly lower than the
wholesale cost incurred to purchase these books and the prices
set by competitors in the e-book industry.228 Unsurprisingly, Amazon quickly captured ninety percent of the market.229 Several
large publishers then partnered with Apple to combat Amazon’s
pricing strategy, resulting in the Department of Justice (DOJ)
filing suit against Apple.230 Shockingly, when confronted with
arguments that it was punishing the wrong companies, the DOJ
stated that there was no evidence to show that Amazon had engaged in predatory pricing.231 Notably, the DOJ viewed the ebook business line to be profitable as a whole and did not take
into account that Amazon could easily recoup its lost profits in
one of several other business lines it operates.232
The analysis that led to the DOJ’s conclusion suffers from the
same flaws evident throughout predatory pricing cases in the airline industry. Specifically, the Brooke Group analysis fails to properly identify actual instances of predatory pricing because it
avoids chilling competition at the expense of allowing actual anticompetitive conduct to continue unfettered.233 In light of the
ever-growing nature of the e-commerce industry and the empirical evidence showing that predation is going undetected, it is no
longer sufficient to accept these false negatives.234 The Brooke
Group test itself—or its application in oligopolistic industries
where monopolists control specific markets—must be changed.
Allowing companies to continue engaging in predatory pricing
17/cheap-words [http://perma.cc/42AN-Y6UT]; and then citing Jeffrey A.
Trachtenberg, E-Book Sales Fall After New Amazon Contracts, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3,
2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/e-book-sales-weaken-amid-higher-prices1441307826 [https://perma.cc/TLE8-VGY6]).
227 Id. at 757.
228 Id.
229 Id. (citing Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 649).
230 Id. at 758 (citing Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 658–61, 681).
231 Id. (citing Response of Plaintiff United States to Public Comments on the
Proposed Final Judgment at 21, Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (No. 12-CV-2826)).
232 Id. at 759.
233 Hemphill & Weiser, supra note 6, at 2052 (“The Court’s approach accepts
some false negatives—anticompetitive above-cost price cuts—in order to avoid
the chilling effect of false positives. Such a lenient rule, however, can be costly.”).
234 Congress has also taken note of this issue and has recommended that
changes be made to predatory pricing law, among other things. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, COM. & ADMIN. LAW OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
116TH CONG., REP. ON INVESTIGATION OF COMPETITION IN DIGITAL MARKETS 19–21
(Comm. Print 2020) (identifying a broad set of reforms for further examination
by the Members of the Subcomittee to consider given the digital economy).
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without appropriate enforcement of the antitrust laws creates
poor incentives for large, powerful companies and thwarts the
goals of antitrust law as a whole.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Brooke Group test has proven to be an unworkable standard not equipped to detect the very conduct it was created to
address. As demonstrated by the test’s application in the airline
and e-commerce industries, the below-cost requirement should
be adjusted to allow for incremental-cost analysis where appropriate. Additionally, the recoupment prong of the test should be
altered to enable plaintiffs to show that companies that incur
losses in the primary market are recouping the losses in different markets or product lines. This change would adequately balance the competing concerns of chilling legitimate, procompetitive business practices and protecting the competitive
process.

